

Why Women in Elected Assemblies Reduce Levels of Corruption: The Indirect Approach

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1. Introduction

A consistent finding in corruption research is that the proportion of women in elected assemblies is related to levels of corruption; that is, the higher the number of women, the lower the level of corruption. This pattern appears not only in cross-country comparative research¹ but also in research focusing on variation in corruption at the subnational level². The mechanisms at work to produce this relationship are, however, still something of a black box. Presently, the theoretical propositions dominating the field focus on personality traits (women being more honest or cautious than men), political background (women being more outsiders than men) and issue area specialization (women being more engaged in welfare issues than men) and the reasons why such factors have a dampening effect on corruption³. A common denominator for these perspectives is that they theorize on the behaviour of women. This paper takes an alternative route and theorizes on plausible changes taking place among men as a result of an influx of women into political organizations. Thus the paper suggests an indirect approach to the study of the link between the proportion of women elected and levels of corruption.

The paper synthesizes three strands of research. The first strand deals with the question of what makes parliaments, and elected assemblies more broadly, distinct from other spheres of government. The inspiration for the indirect approach comes from the seminal book *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate*, by Barbara Sinclair, spelling out how an «encapsulated men's club», such as the United States Senate in the 1950s, could transform into an outward-looking institution in the 1970s⁴. Sinclair does not focus on corruption, but her book is one of the most comprehensive analyses of how far-reaching changes in political institutions take place.

An important aspect, highlighted by Sinclair, is the role that regularly held elections play for renewal also among senior members of an institution⁵.

The second strand of research discussed in this paper deals with corruption as a collective action problem and use social learning (SL) theory to provide insights into how corrupt settings may be transformed⁶. SL theory helps to describe corruption as a social process that involves networks, without losing touch with the fact that corruption, ultimately, is the result of decisions, choices and behaviour at the level of the individual. An important aspect, previously overlooked in research on gender and corruption, is the role that emotions play for both the maintenance and the break-up of collusion.

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The final and third strand of research concerns why shifts in the gender balance, the influx of women into political institutions, should provide an impetus for norm transformation in the area of corruption. This section takes its departure not only from previous research on the link between women in elected assemblies and levels of corruption but also from recent research where non-categorical measures of gender have been used to capture a mix of feminine and masculine characteristics embodied in individuals⁷. These non-categorical gender measures substantiate the core argument in this paper, which is that an influx of women into political institutions is accompanied by an influx of empathic and other-regarding values. In short, the argument is that the important indirect change taking place, leading to lower levels of corruption, is that empathic and other-regarding values are given more space and involve men to a greater extent when women become present in higher numbers.

The indirect approach necessitates renewed methodological thinking in research on gender and corruption. The concluding section discusses what this approach means for empirical studies and for the pending question in this field, namely, *why* the proportion of women in elected assemblies is related to levels of corruption. The pattern «the higher the number of women, the lower the level of corruption» repeats itself over and over again, but there is still a rather long way to go before we can say with certainty which mechanism or mechanisms are causing this effect.

2. Institutional change

In democracies, change in elected assemblies is one of the most important features. This is why general elections are held. Citizens are expected to evaluate parties and candidates each time they take a vote.

In election campaigns we find party programmes and pledges arguing for different policy solutions. However, Sinclair's analysis focuses on transformations at a more fundamental level, that is, how politics is done in practice, regardless of which president, prime minister or party is in power. In her book she describes how an inward-looking, stable, bounded and predictable policymaking system becomes «a highly participatory and open body that accords its members very wide latitude»⁸. Changes are visible in the distribution of positions in powerful committees; in how senators use the floor for deliberation and decision-making; and in how senators interact with media, civil society, and more generally, the outside world.

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One can dispute how long lasting these changes were and how special the US Senate is as a case, but the point is that Sinclair studies a highly powerful institution where most people in incumbent positions had few incentives to change standard operating procedures. Compared to other strands of research on change in institutions, her work is of special interest since she underlines the important role that elections play. Sinclair contends that the important factor behind the transformation of the US Senate was pressure by liberal northern Democrats who, in a sequence of elections, entered the Senate in large numbers in the 1960s. Moreover, this influx was accompanied with a pressure on new directions in controversial issues such as those concerning the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement.

In the final chapter of her book Sinclair extends the reasoning to a more general level of institutional change. For the proceedings of this paper, the important observations are that norms and informal arrangements that structure behaviour within political institutions will only be altered if they hamper certain goals, which means that change is facilitated if newcomers have values and priorities that are distinct from those among incumbents. Moreover, there is an important difference between rules and norms, in that rules need formal processes to change, whereas the change of norms can start with individual decisions of non-conformity to standard operating procedures. Finally, far-reaching changes are the result of a cumulative process where deviations from existing norms and informal arrangements are less and less frequently punished by those with power over attractive positions and resources.

It is widely recognized that formal rules and regulations are not enough to stop corruption from taking place. The 1990s represent a turning point when corruption started to be viewed as obstructing rather than greasing the wheels of social and economic development. Since

then, anticorruption policies have spread across the globe, and currently, 188 countries have ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which is presented as «the only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument»⁹. Furthermore, many countries have their own anti-corruption laws and oversight agencies. Thus, to understand how corruption can be reduced, focus needs to be directed to norm transformations and cumulative processes, such as the ones described by Sinclair, rather than to any immediate change taking place as a result of formal decision-making.

16 What makes elected assemblies different from other spheres of government and organizations is precisely the general elections. In his book *The Principles of Representative Government*, Bernard Manin¹⁰ points out that in elected assemblies, success that is, being elected, builds on the ability of individuals to stand out and thereby attract attention and votes. Moreover, electoral politics has to do with ideology and values, and it is likely that competition in this particular sphere triggers the activation of personal characteristics among contenders. In line with this reasoning, Sinclair argues that newcomers to elected assemblies may be especially keen to make an imprint, since they often are elected in less safe seats than senior colleagues¹¹. Thus, newcomers may be driven by a real wish to make a change, but the reliance on public support seem to provide an extra impetus to «stand out». In sum, elected assemblies are distinct spheres of government, and regularly held elections are plausible facilitators of far-reaching changes in these institutions.

3. Corruption as a collective action problem and SL theory as a solution

In several publications, Bo Rothstein argues that policymakers have put too much focus on measures such as the UN Convention against Corruption, intended to change incentives for corrupt actors¹². The foundation for these types of measures – including tougher punishment, more stringent laws and increased surveillance – is, according to Rothstein, a view of corruption stemming from principal–agent (PA) theory. Put simply, PA theory suggests that corruption will decrease when the individual (agent) perceives the cost of being caught as higher than the gain from performing a corrupt act such as paying or accepting a bribe. The alternative view, suggested by Rothstein and colleagues, is to understand corruption as a collective action problem where «agents are willing to

do «the right thing» provided that they have reason to expect others to do the same»¹³.

Understanding corruption as a collective action problem produces different policy solutions from the solutions based on PA theory. Rothstein contends that effective policies against corruption must destabilize the corrupt equilibrium. On the societal level this means enacting policies that change «the basic social contract»¹⁴, such as a functioning system of taxation and/or free universal public education that gives people, in large numbers, reasons and resources to abandon ongoing corrupt interactions. Rothstein and colleagues emphasize impartiality as the opposite of corruption, which is described in the following way: «When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law»¹⁵. This definition however alludes to the exercise of public power in the administrative branch of government. Electoral politics is different, aiming for the creation of policies and laws. For elected assemblies there is a need to find other concepts that capture the ideal of a well-functioning non-corrupt institution. A widely accepted definition of corruption is «the abuse of entrusted power for private gain»¹⁶ which signals that a common feature of all forms of corruption is that it involves a private gain at the cost of a public good. From that starting point, the opposite of corruption could, in the case of elected assemblies, best be formulated in terms of an institution characterized by other-regarding rather than self-regarding values¹⁷. Then, *self-regarding* refers to behaviour that serves not only the private gain of an individual politician and his/her family and friends but also, for example, the party elite. In contrast, *other-regarding* refers to behaviour that serves the public good of a wide stratum of the population, even if the demarcation is difficult to draw in any exact way.

Even if corruption is understood as a collective action problem, there is a need to theorize on how a break-up of a corrupt equilibrium can start at the individual level. Change does not just happen. The basic assumption in SL theory is that individual behaviour is acquired and sustained via informal processes in an organization or institution such as an elected assembly¹⁸. These informal processes involve the adoption of definitions, that is, evaluations of certain behaviour as good or bad; imitation of peer behaviour; and punishment for transgression of organizational standard operating procedures but also positive reinforcement provided by rewards. Simple things like language can play an important role when wrongdoing spreads across individuals, that is, seemingly neutral terms like «gifts» or

«encouragement» can be part of a moral disengagement process sanitizing corrupt behaviour. More important, however, is probably a mechanism of emotional contagion: First, it should be recognized that newcomers to an organization often are eased into wrongdoing incrementally, thereby masking their descent into corruption. Second, organizational members may feel strong obligations to their organization. Emotional contagion can, based on these assumptions, follow different processes, one being a direct process where newcomers, in interactions with core-member «spokespersons» of an organization, are informed, often in subtle ways, that they have transgressed behaviour regarded as appropriate. In such situations newcomers are likely to experience feelings of embarrassment and shame and sense that they have been devalued. There can also be a vicarious process where newcomers themselves are not the targets, but where they learn about organizational «right» and «wrong» by witnessing transgressions by others or hearing about such incidents and seeing how the targeted individuals then have been devalued. Finally, praise for compliance with informal norms and subsequent participation in wrongdoing can lead to a sense of pride and feelings of being accepted.

A key point in SL theory is that it is organizational members who strongly identify with their organization that are likely to feel shame or embarrassment when rebuked for actions that are inconsistent with ongoing standard operating procedures such as corrupt practices¹⁹. Less strongly identified members may, when directly rebuked or hearing stories about others, instead react with anger. This means that even in an organization or institution characterized by coordinated wrongdoing, one can expect islands of potential resistance. From such islands, what starts to emerge are conflicting norms between group loyalty and the wish of individuals to do the right thing. How people weight these competing concerns will have powerful implications for how corruption is deterred or promoted²⁰.

In sum, SL theory helps to describe corruption as a social process that involves networks, without losing touch with the fact that corruption, ultimately, is the result of decisions, choices and behaviour at the level of the individual. Emotions are important triggers of behaviour, and what we learn from SL theory is that emotions are social phenomena that depend on the reactions of peers and/or core actors such as various spokespersons of an organization. Since SL contributes to upholding a state of corrupt equilibrium, it is reasonable to assume that it also can contribute to its destabilization. When Sinclair discusses the mechanisms at work in institutional change, she highlights the role of leaders who have to maintain balance between different fractions of an organization²¹. She

exemplifies how recurrent revolts against established norms gradually reduce leaders' sanctioning resources. When enough members press for change, the cost of providing (private) «goods» to other fractions increases until they reach a tipping point where the cost simply is too high. In the context of elected assemblies a truly high cost is a party imploding and being unable to win upcoming elections. Thus, corruption may vanish not because incumbents wish for this to happen but because the cost of losing the seat is valued as higher than the gain from continued corruption.

4. How the influx of women may trigger a learning process

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Early work in the area of gender and corruption almost exclusively focused on women being different from men. For example, David Dollar and colleagues²² assumed, in one of the first studies on this topic, that women are more honest than men. A group around Anand Swamy²³ proposed a number of hypotheses for why gender has an effect in the area of corruption: women may have been brought up to be more honest or risk averse than men; women, who are typically more involved in raising children, may find they have to practice honesty in order to teach their children appropriate values; women may feel that laws exist to protect them or, more generally, girls may be brought up to have higher levels of self-control than boys, which is assumed to affect women's propensity to indulge in criminal behaviour.

Recent research has made several contributions. First, it has been demonstrated that the link between gender and corruption is much stronger in democracies than in authoritarian states²⁴. Second, studies indicate that the pattern «higher proportion of women, lower level of corruption» is visible in analyses focusing on the proportion of women in elected assemblies but not to the same extent in studies focusing on the proportion of women in administrative/bureaucratic positions²⁵. In contemporary research, scholars focus on the conditions triggering an effect of gender rather than on any intrinsic gender characteristics relevant across all contexts.

An influential line of research flows from the finding that the correlation between the proportion of women in elected assemblies and levels of corruption appears in democracies but not in authoritarian states, and contends that democratic institutions activate the relationship²⁶. The suggestion these scholars are making is that the combination of women's risk aversion, women being more cautious than men, and voters' propensity to

hold women to higher standards may explain the stronger gender–corruption link in high accountability settings, that is, where the likelihood of voter punishment for misconduct is apparent. A second line of reasoning in research on gender and corruption suggest that women may be less involved in corruption because they simply lack the opportunities to conduct «reckless» acts²⁷. This strand of research emphasizes women's outsider status and mechanisms excluding them from male-dominated networks where corrupt and collusive transactions take place²⁸.

20 The risk-aversion hypothesis and the outsider hypothesis are recurrent themes in contemporary gender and corruption research²⁹. However, both perspectives run into difficulties when the aim is to understand how an influx of women into a political institution such as an elected assembly, can trigger transformations towards lower levels of corruption. What these theoretical approaches can explain is why women refrain from corruption, but there is no clear link to forward-looking reform-oriented elements.

More relevant to the reasoning in this paper is research presented by Monika Bauhr and colleagues where they state that corruption can be an obstacle to the political advancement of women at the same time as greater representation of women can cause decreased corruption³⁰. What they suggest is a two-level theory where, on one level, related to electoral responsiveness, the correlation between female elected representatives and reduced petty corruption is explained by female politicians' choice of policy agendas. In accordance with scholarship on a «women's interest mechanism»³¹, they embark from findings in research on gender and political attitudes/behaviour showing that women in elected office are more likely than their male colleagues to seek to improve public service delivery, and in particular, the types of services that tend to benefit women as a group. On another level, more related to the dynamics within institutions, Bauhr and colleagues³² suggest that the presence of grand corruption serves as an obstacle to the political advancement of women and that, against this backdrop, it is rational for female politicians to seek to break collusive networks detrimental to their careers. Using data from a regional-level survey on petty corruption and objective measures of both grand corruption risks and the share of locally elected female representatives across European regions, the empirical results largely corroborate their theoretical expectations. The proportion of local female political representatives is strongly associated with decreased levels of both petty and grand corruption. Moreover, using cross-level interactions between female representation in local councils and gender of the respondent, they find that, while both men and women experience less bribery as the share

of women elected increases, it is in fact the rate of bribe paying among women that decreases most strongly - in particular, in the education and health services.

Summing up, there are a number of studies with the ambition to present causal reasoning linking the presence of women in elected assemblies to reductions in levels of corruption. The theoretical mechanisms proposed are, however, seldom directly tested; instead, scholars tend to use designs where a large number of control variables are introduced to rule out rival hypotheses. These designs leave us with a number of loose ends that need to be more carefully dealt with. First, the underlying logic in the risk-aversion theory is that an increased presence of women in political institutions will eventually crowd out corrupt men and thereby reduce corruption. One objection to this is that corrupt networks are skilled, and most likely, even if the number of men decreases, they will find enough remaining corruption-prone partners to interact with. Second, research highlighting women's issue area specialization has a hard time finding concrete examples where female politicians have implemented visible strategies to fight corruption.

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5. Towards a synthesis

The suggestion from Sinclair, that is, that change within an institution is facilitated if newcomers have values and priorities that are distinct from those among incumbents, speaks to research on gender and corruption focusing on issue area specialization. The areas female politicians tend to pursue to a higher degree than their male colleagues, namely, welfare issues such as health and education are, at least in the European context, highly dependent on public funding and therefore in the need of non-corrupt well-functioning structures for taxation as well as public service delivery.

It is plausible that women elected representatives have special incentives to make an imprint and push for efficient processes in areas affecting the daily life of women citizens. The argument in this paper, however, is that the important changes taking place in elected assemblies, leading to lower levels of corruption, do not only concern policy agendas. Perhaps even more important to take into account are processes where self-regarding values are replaced by other-regarding values. This is where SL theory comes in. A large bulk of psychological research shows that the understanding of others' internal states develops in concert with other-oriented concern, and that empathy plays a primary role in eliciting

prosocial behaviour³³. In social psychology, prosocial behaviour used to capture whether bystanders interfere in situations concerning an unknown other, but the perspective has started to include a variety of behaviours to the benefit of collective sets of unknown others³⁴. Moreover, prosocial behaviour is often comprehended as standing against self-interest mechanisms and favouring the provision of the public good³⁵. These ideas are mirrored in research from Eric Uslaner³⁶, where he suggests that trust leads to empathy with others and that empathy is the mechanism behind respect for the law, and in experimental studies demonstrating that empathy predicts sensitivity to justice for others³⁷.


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Feminist research has long recognized that gender is a malleable category, that men and women can be more or less typically «masculine» and «feminine», respectively. In fact, individuals often perceive themselves as having a mix of masculine and feminine characteristics, but the composition of these characteristics varies from one person to the other³⁸. As previously discussed, recent publications use rating scales where they ask respondents about their self-perceptions regarding gendered characteristics. A major point in this literature is to have two scales, where respondents can choose any combination of masculine and feminine characteristics, since these are not posed as opposite ends on a single scale. For instance, results from Sweden demonstrate that most women tend to choose values high on the femininity scale (many such characteristics), and most men tend to choose values on the lower part of that scale. Correspondingly, the results demonstrate that most men tend to choose values on the upper part of the masculinity scale (many such characteristics), and most women tend to choose values on the lower part of that scale³⁹. However, substantial numbers deviate from the more traditional and expected patterns, and very few refute having any characteristics associated with the opposite sex. In addition, recent research reports results from surveys where respondents, in connection to placing themselves on gender-identity rating scales, have been asked to report what they perceive as masculine and feminine characteristics, respectively. These studies reveal great variation in perceptions of masculine and feminine characteristics, but at the same time, when grouped together, answers tend to reflect expected patterns, where «care for others» and «empathy» are perceived as typical feminine characteristics, whereas «self-sufficiency» and «dominance» are perceived as typical masculine characteristics⁴⁰.

SL theory states that individual behaviour is acquired and sustained via informal processes. Social learning can take place in incremental

ways, and the argument in this paper builds on the idea that increases in female representation step by step erode the acceptance of self-regarding behaviour. An important part of the story is that most individuals perceive themselves as having a mix of masculine and feminine characteristics. When the surroundings, for example, in an elected assembly, change to include more women and fewer men, more men might find it acceptable to activate traditional feminine values of empathy and care. The assumption is that, for traditional masculine values of self-sufficiency and dominance, a destabilizing process first takes place at the individual level, and when norms within a substantial number of individuals have changed, the prerequisites for a self-regarding corrupt equilibrium at the group level vanish. These ideas are summarized in Figure 1 below, modelling an indirect effect of women’s political representation on levels of corruption:

Fig. 1 - Modelling an indirect effect of women’s political representation on levels of corruption



6. Moving forward

This paper synthesizes rather different strands of research to argue that an influx of women into elected assemblies is accompanied by the influx of empathic and other-regarding values and that an important change, eventually leading to lower levels of corruption, is that self-regarding values, not individual men, are replaced. Emotional contagion is recognized as the mechanism behind a reversed learning process, where corruption and

self-regarding behaviour are devalued and prosocial behaviour upgraded and rewarded. On the theoretical level, this means a shift from studies focusing on differences between men and women to studies focusing on characteristics that are activated among men when the number of women in an institution such as an elected assembly increases. For the influx of women to have an effect, it is, probably, helpful if an increase is accompanied with a public debate on «women's interests», such as welfare policies, and/or other types of equality and justice efforts. Indeed, empathy can trigger protective behaviour restricted to family and close networks, but in certain situations empathy may promote a widened perspective and lead to prosocial behaviour on behalf of broad layers of the population. The role of general elections should not be underestimated – even the most cynical party leadership can change when power is at risk.

There are several limitations to the approach proposed in this paper. First, the empirical evidence needed to test the propositions made is hard to collect. A first step would be to use experimental designs to tease out effects of gender and empathy in new ways and also to do case studies following developments in countries and local communities over time. The advantage of the reasoning in this paper is that it pushes gender and corruption scholars to look for changes among men and for policies strengthening the provision of public goods, rather than looking for concrete examples where female politicians have implemented laws or other direct strategies to fight corruption. Second, the propositions made are probably less relevant in settings where low rule of law and pervasive corruption have become the social norm, that is, in places where changes are needed the most. Without pockets of resistance, change is hard to achieve. Third, the step where a transformed elected assembly affects other public institutions, and further down the road, society as a whole, is not discussed in this paper. Finally, social learning processes may wax and wane between different endpoints on a self-regarding versus other-regarding scale, and positive, corruption-reducing developments can, through the influx of large groups of nonempathic politicians, come to a halt. In short, gender equality is certainly no «quick fix», and we cannot expect any linear process towards good governance.

Note

¹ See D.R. DOLLAR, R. FISMAN, R. GATTI, *Are Women Really the Fairer Sex? Corruption and Women in Government*, in «Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization», vol. 26, n. 4, 2001, pp.4 23-429; J. ESAREY, G. CHIRILLO, *'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender and Institutional Context*, in «Politics & Gender», vol. 94, 2013, pp. 361-389; J. ESAREY, L. SCHWINDT-BAYER, *Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies*, in «British Journal of Politics», vol. 48, n. 3, 2018, pp. 659-690; A. SWAMY, S. KNACK, Y. LEE, O. AZFAR, *Gender and Corruption*, in «Journal of Development Economics», vol. 64, n. 1, 2001, pp. 25-55.

² M. BAUHR, N. CHARRON, L. WÄNGNERUD, *Exclusion or Interests? Why Females in Elected Office Reduce Petty and Grand Corruption*, in «European Journal of Political Research», vol. 58, n. 4, 2019, pp. 1043-1065; M. GRIMES, L. WÄNGNERUD, *Gender and Corruption: Building a Theory of Conditioned Causality*, in H. STENSÖTA, L. WÄNGNERUD (Eds.), *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2018, pp. 191-212; A. SUNDRÖM, L. WÄNGNERUD, *Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation: Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries*, in «Party Politics», vol. 22, n. 3, 2016, pp. 354-369.

³ A.C. ALEXANDER, *Gender, Gender Equality, and Corruption: A Review of Theory and Evidence*, in A. BÅGENHOLM, M. BAUHR, M. GRIMES, B. ROTHSTEIN (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Quality of Government*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2021, is a recent article that gives a good overview of research on gender and corruption.

⁴ B. SINCLAIR, *The Transformation of the US Senate*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD 1989.

⁵ For this point, see also B. MANIN, *The Principles of Representative Government*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 1997.

⁶ The reasoning here is inspired by B. DONG, U. DULLECK, B. TORGLER, *Conditional Corruption*, in «Journal of Economic Psychology», vol. 33, 2012, pp. 609-627; J. DUNGAN, A. WAYTZ, L. YOUNG, *Corruption in the Context of Moral Trade-Offs*, in «Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics», vol. 26, n. 1-2, 2014, pp. 97-118; K. SMITH-CROWE, D.E. WARREN, *The Emotion-evoked Collective Corruption Model: The Role of Emotions in the Spread of Corruption within Organizations*, in «Organization Science», vol. 25, n. 4, 2014, pp. 1154-1171; M. TAVITS, *Why Do People Engage in Corruption? The Case of Estonia*, in «Social Forces», vol. 88, n. 3, 2010, pp. 1257-1280; J. WARBURTON, *Corruption as a Social Process: From Dyads to Networks*, in P. LARMOUR, N. WOLANIN (Eds.), *Corruption and Anti-corruption*, ANU Press, 2013, retrieved from <https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/corruption-and-anti-corruption>.

⁷ For recent studies in the U.S. and Sweden, see E. GIDENGIL, D. STOLLE, *Comparing Self-categorisation Approaches to Measuring Gender Identity*, in «European Journal of Politics and Gender», vol. 4, n. 1, 2021, pp. 31-50; D. MAGLIOZZI, A. SAPERSTEIN, L. WESTBROOK, *Scaling Up: Representing Gender Diversity in Survey Research*, in «Socius», vol. 2, 2016, pp. 1-11; E. MARKSTEDT, M. SOLEVID, L.

WÄNGNERUD, M. DJERF-PIERRE, *The Subjective Meaning of Gender: How Survey Designs Affect Perceptions of Femininity and Masculinity*, in «European Journal of Politics and Gender», vol. 4, n. 1, 2021, pp. 51-70; L. WÄNGNERUD, M. SOLEVID, M. DJERF-PIERRE, *Moving Beyond Categorical Gender in Studies of Risk Aversion and Anxiety*, in «Politics & Gender», vol. 15, n. 4, 2019, pp. 826-850.

⁸ B. SINCLAIR, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹ <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html>.

¹⁰ B. MANIN, *op. cit.*

¹¹ B. SINCLAIR, *op. cit.*

¹² B. ROTHSTEIN, *Fighting Systemic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy*, in «Daedalus», vol. 147, n. 3, 2018, p. 1.

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¹³ B. ROTHSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 8; see also A. PERSSON, B. ROTHSTEIN, J. TEORELL, *Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail - Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem*, in «Governance», vol. 26, n. 3, 2012, pp. 449-471, and B. ROTHSTEIN, A. VARRAICH, *Making Sense of Corruption*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017.

¹⁴ B. ROTHSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁵ B. ROTHSTEIN, J. TEORELL, *What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Political Institutions*, in «Governance», vol. 21, n. 2, 2008, p. 170.

¹⁶ See <https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption>.

¹⁷ This distinction resembles the distinction between programmatic versus clientelistic parties (cf. H. KITSCHEL, *Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions*, in «Party Politics», vol. 1, n. 4, 1995, pp. 447-472), but my focus is more on the level of individual elected representatives.

¹⁸ K. SMITH-CROWE, D.E. WARREN, *op. cit.*, J. WARBURTON, *op. cit.*, but see also S. MORADI, N. VAN QUAQUEBEKE, J.A. HUNTER, *Flourishing and Prosocial Behavior: A Multilevel Investigation of National Corruption Level as Moderator*, in «PloS One», vol. 13, n. 7, 2018, <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0200062>.

¹⁹ K. SMITH-CROWE, D.E. WARREN, *op. cit.*, p. 1155.

²⁰ J. DUNGAN, A. WAYTZ, L. YOUNG, *op. cit.*

²¹ B. SINCLAIR, *op. cit.*

²² D.R. DOLLAR, R. FISMAN, R. GATTI, *op. cit.*

²³ A. SWAMY, S. KNACK, Y. LEE, O. AZFAR, *op. cit.*

²⁴ J. ESAREY, G. CHIRILLO, *op. cit.*; H. STENSÖTA, L. WÄNGNERUD (Eds.), *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2018.

²⁵ H. STENSÖTA, L. WÄNGNERUD, R. SVENSSON, *Gender and Corruption: The Mediating Power of Institutional Logics*, in «Governance», vol. 28, n. 4, 2015, pp. 475-496.

²⁶ A prominent example is J. ESAREY, L. SCHWINDT-BAYER, *op. cit.*

²⁷ N. TORGLER, N.T. VALEV, *Corruption and Age*, in «Journal of Bioeconomics», vol. 8, n. 2, 2006, p. 138.

²⁸ E. BJARNEGÅRD, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*, Palgrave Macmil-

lan, London 2013; A.M. GOETZ, *Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-corruption Force?*, in «Development and Change», vol. 38, n. 1, 2007, pp. 87-105; A. SUNDRÖM, L. WÄNGNERUD, *op. cit.*

²⁹ See T. BARNES, E. BEAULIEU, G.W. SAXTON, *Restoring Trust in the Police: Why Female Officers Reduce Suspicions of Corruption*, in «Governance», vol. 31, n. 1, 2018, pp. 143-161; T. BARNES, E. BEAULIEU, *Gender Stereotypes and Corruption: How Candidates Affect Perceptions of Election Fraud*, in «Politics & Gender», vol. 10, n. 3, 2014, pp. 365-391; A.C. EGGERS, *Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal*, in «Quarterly Journal of Political Science», vol. 9, n. 4, 2014, pp. 441-472; N. WISEHOMEIER, T. VERGE, *Corruption, Opportunity Networks, and Gender: Stereotypes of Female Politicians' Corruptibility*, in «Public Opinion Quarterly», published online ahead of print Dec 6 2020.

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³³ J. DECETY, K.J. YODER, *Empathy and Motivation for Justice: Cognitive Empathy and Concern, but not Emotional Empathy, Predict Sensitivity to Injustice for Others*, in «Social Neuroscience», vol. 11, n. 1, 2016, pp. 1-14, and references therein.

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³⁹ L. WÄNGNERUD, M. SOLEVID, M. DJERF-PIERRE, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ *Ivi*, pp. 13-14; E. MARKSTEDT, M. SOLEVID, L. WÄNGNERUD, M. DJERF-PIERRE, *op.cit.*, p. 71.